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The New Guinea Campaign: A New Perspective Through the Use of Oral Histories
Abstract
Over the past two decades, historians have
begun using oral histories to reinterpret the
history of World War II. Earlier historians
have relied heavily on official documents,
journalists’ accounts and the letters, diaries,
and memoirs of commanders and staff
officers, leaving out the experiences of
the common soldier. Oral histories have
provided more detailed, personal, and
emotional accounts of WWII than the
written records. My research combines the
oral histories of the 32nd Infantry Division,
the Red Arrow Division, with written
sources in order to gain new perspectives
and insight into the soldiers’ experiences in
WWII during the New Guinea campaign.

Kelli Brockschmidt
McNair Scholar

James Smither, Ph.D.
Faculty Mentor

The New Guinea Campaign:
A New Perspective Through the Use
of Oral Histories
As I was walking through the dense
jungle, I hiked through the kunai
grass; it was razor sharp grass that
grew from two to twelve feet high.
I was leading men on a mission to
take a Japanese pillbox, and I saw a
path that was cut through the kunai
grass. I thought, “Why am I going
through this tall grass? I’ll go where
I can see,” so I went down the path.
Then all of a sudden it dawned
on me that this was a pre-cut fire
lane and that a Japanese machine
gun was training in on me from
the other side. I instinctively dove
for the other side and as I did they
cut loose with their machine guns.
A bullet hit me in my arm and leg
and another ricocheted off the stock
of my rifle that luckily lay across
my chest. All I could think about
was that I knew I was hit.1
This is an account from an oral history
with Sergeant Robert Hartmen of the
126th Infantry Regiment in the 32nd
Infantry Division. He is recalling
the Battle of Buna, which began in
November of 1942 and was part of
the New Guinea Campaign, one of the
longest and most grueling campaigns
fought by United States ground forces
in World War II. It began on September
20, 1942 and lasted until November 10,
1944.2 New Guinea’s location off the
northern coast of Australia and its status
as the second largest island in the world
made it an ideal location for Japanese
attack, and the hard-won Allied victory
there helped to make the final victory
possible.3 Despite its importance, the
New Guinea Campaign has become one
of WWII’s forgotten episodes. The use
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Robert Hartmen, oral history, Michigan Military History Institute (MMHI).
The 32nd Division Veteran Association, 32nd Infantry Division, The Red Arrow in World War II, http: //www.32nd-division.org/history/ww2/32ww2.html.
3 Harry A. Gailey, MacArthur Strikes Back: Decision at Buna, New Guinea 1942-1943 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2000), 9.
2

GVSU McNair Scholars Journal VOLUME 9, 2005

25

of oral histories makes it possible to do
justice to the New Guinea campaign and
the efforts of the men who fought it.
Over the past two decades, historians
have begun to utilize oral histories to
reinterpret the events of World War II.
The Veterans History Project (VHP),
established in 2000 by the Library of
Congress (LOC), has expanded these
efforts by promoting the collection
and preservation of the memories
of America’s wartime veterans. Oral
histories provide personal details that
are not found in written records. The
oral histories of the 32nd Infantry
Division, more commonly known as
the Red Arrow Division, add a personal
perspective to aspects of the campaign
that have been typically ignored or
overlooked in the existing written
histories. These new details help to
explain the course and outcome of the
campaign. Above all, the oral histories
shed light on the soldiers’ training, their
incessant struggles with the difficult
terrain, their relationships with the
Australian allies, and their sufferings
from tropical diseases. They not only
add detail to existing accounts, but also
correct distortions and outright errors
in those accounts, making it possible to
produce a more complete and accurate
picture of the campaign.
The Red Arrow Division, which
fought in World War I and World
War II, originally began as a blended
National Guard unit with men from
Michigan and Wisconsin. The Division
had three regiments that fought during
the New Guinea Campaign: the 126th,
127th, and 128th Infantry Regiments.
According to an oral history with
Sergeant Robert Hartmen of the 126th

Infantry Regiment, the division had
twelve companies in it from across
Michigan, from Coldwater to Grand
Rapids and Grand Haven to Ionia.4 The
Red Arrow Division was reactivated in
October 1940, and the men were sent to
train at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana. In
February 1941, they were sent to Camp
Livingston, Louisiana.5 The Red Arrow
Division was one of the first National
Guard units to be called up to active
federal service. As a National Guard
unit, they were not required to serve
outside of the western hemisphere or
for more than twelve months anywhere
else. It took a congressional bill to relax
the restrictions and extend the service
dates of the Red Arrow Division. This
bill was passed in August 1941, by a
slim one-vote margin.6 After the attack
on Pearl Harbor, the United States began
preparations to send troops overseas
to fight. The Red Arrow Division was
shipped to Fort Devens, Massachusetts
to prepare for an early departure to
Northern Ireland, but shortly after
arrival at Fort Devens, their orders
changed. Instead, the Red Arrow
Division was sent to California and on
April 22, 1942, it set sail for Australia.7
The division landed in Adelaide, South
Australia and was transported halfway
across the continent to Camp Cable in
Brisbane for more training before it was
ordered to New Guinea on September
13, 1942.8 The Red Arrow Division
ended World War II with a total of 654
days in combat, which rivaled any other
combat unit in America’s history.9
There are discrepancies between the
written texts and Red Arrow veterans’
oral histories when examining whether
the men had training, and how much of

it they had. According to the majority of
written histories, the men received little
general training and no jungle warfare
training before being sent to New
Guinea. An official Army commentary
stated,
It was largely an army of amateurs
in which many officers were
occupied chiefly in learning how to
be officers, and the men were being
trained with scant equipment, and
without realization, on their part,
of the dead seriousness of the task
ahead.10
According to Harry Gailey, author
of MacArthur Strikes Back Decision at
Buna: New Guinea 1942-1943, the 32nd
Division was unlucky to be selected to
operate in New Guinea because none
of their training prepared them for the
environment.11 The official division
history notes, “The 32d Division’s
composition as it began its field training
was basically the same as it had been
during World War I.”12
On the other hand, the oral histories
from the Red Arrow veterans who
served in the New Guinea Campaign
reveal that the soldiers did receive jungle
warfare training once they arrived in
Australia and New Guinea. Red Arrow
veteran Wellington Francis Homminga
explains that the training was similar
in both places, but the change in the
terrain made a significant impact on
their training. While in Brisbane, they
were training at Sandy Creek, and they
had general training with rifles, machine
guns, grenades, terrain maneuvers, and
jungle warfare. He explains that the jungle
warfare training increased once they
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Robert Hartmen.
Public Relations Office, 32nd Infantry Division, 13,000 Hours, 4.
6 Major General H. W. Blakeley, The 32nd Infantry Division in World War II (Nashville: The Battery Press, 1957), 10-11.
7 Blakeley, 20.
8 Blakeley, 33.
9 Blakeley, inside cover.
10 Blakeley, 9.
11 Gailey, 102.
12 Blakeley, 10.
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arrived in Brisbane, Australia. There they
were sent out into the Blue Gum woods
with a series of compass readings, and
they had to find their way back. They
used the compass to find a specific area or
person that was designated as their goal.
In his oral history, Homminga compares
this training to the training the soldiers
received immediately after arriving in
New Guinea. He states, “You walked
into the jungle and you immediately
did not know where you were, the only
thing you had to go by was the compass
headings.”13 He says that in Australia the
soldiers at least had some sense of where
they were going, but in New Guinea they
could wander around for hours in the
jungle without knowing where they were.
Homminga’s oral history reveals that the
men did receive training that was related
to jungle warfare and that they were
trained on how to venture through the
jungles of New Guinea. These insights,
revealed through oral histories, at least
partially contradict what the written
histories, such as the official history, assert
about the men’s training.
The second issue that the text
draws attention to is in the official
written history of the 32nd Infantry
Division where it examines General
Eichelberger’s (Commander of the
Eighth Army of which the 32nd was
a part) controversial book, Our Jungle
Road to Tokyo where he writes:
In Washington I had read General
MacArthur’s estimates of his two
infantry divisions, [32nd and 41st]
and these reports and our own
inspections had convinced my staff
and me that the American troops were
in no sense ready for jungle warfare.

I told Generals MacArthur and
Sutherland, MacArthur’s Chief of Staff,
that I thought the 32d Division was
not sufficiently trained to meet the
Japanese veterans on equal terms.14
According to an oral history with Red
Arrow veteran Stephen Janicki, while
the soldiers were not fully trained for
jungle warfare, they were somewhat
prepared for Japanese tactics because
of the instructions they received from
the Australians. While the soldiers were
in Brisbane, Australian officers came
to their camp and trained them on
Japanese tactics and operations. Janicki
recalls the Australian officers telling
them to be on alert because the Japanese
were cunning, ruthless, and that they
were everywhere, including in the trees.
The officers explained that the Japanese
would tie themselves to trees, which
meant that the soldiers had to watch
both the ground and the jungle canopy
in order to defend themselves from the
cunning Japanese. Later in Janicki’s oral
history, he refers to his training and
recalls that they realized that what the
Australians had told them was true, that
the Japanese were in the trees, so they
began to fire upon the trees while in
combat.15 Janicki’s oral history adds new
insight into the wartime experiences
of the Red Arrow Division. While the
written histories portray the troops
as lacking and incapable because of
insufficient training, the oral histories
reveal that the training the men received
helped them while they were involved
in action. This shows that while the
soldiers may have been undertrained,
the limited jungle training that they did
have was of value to them.

There are two main examples seen
in the descriptions of the jungle terrain
that lack detail, oversimplify, and do
not draw conclusions about how it
affected the soldiers while in battle.
First, written histories tend to generalize
the hardships of the terrain, glossing
over the effects it had on the soldiers’
fighting conditions. Authors like Samuel
Milner in his book Victory in Papua, The
War in the Pacific fail to recognize how
the terrain affected the men. He writes,
“The terrain, as varied as it is difficult,
is a military nightmare. Towering sawtoothed mountains, densely covered
by mountain forest and rain forest…”16
This statement draws attention to
the problematic terrain, but it fails to
recognize and make any connections
to how it affected the soldiers who
were fighting a war in the middle of
it. Author Harry Gailey also uses such
broad statements in his book, MacArthur
Strikes Back Decision at Buna: New Guinea
1942-1943 when he writes:
The area around Buna was
dominated by the Girua River,
which emptied into the bay
through several channels. One of
these, Entrance Creek, wound its
way between the village and the
government station. To the east
was a huge swamp formed by
the backup of the river over the
low-lying ground. These natural
obstacles alone would make it
difficult for troops moving toward
Buna from the interior.17
This written account observes that the
terrain caused problems for the troops,
but it does not explain how the terrain
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17 Gailey, 37.
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affected the soldiers themselves. Milner
also over generalizes why the terrain was
a military nightmare. He writes,
It rained steadily during the preceding
few weeks, and the heavy tropical
downpour continued….Except for
a few abandoned plantations and
mission stations, the corridor was a
sodden welter of jungle and swamp,
an utter nightmare for any force
operating in it.18
With details such as these, the
reader is left questioning what sort
of a nightmare was it for the actual
common soldiers, and what were their
experiences like in this nightmare?
The written texts document that the
terrain was so miserable that it could
be explained as a military nightmare,
but they do not examine how it directly
affected the soldiers.
Through the use of the Red Arrow
accounts the necessary details that are
not seen in the written histories are used
to help interpret how the hardships
of the terrain affected the men while
in battle. For example, according to
the veterans, the rivers caused several
problems. Hartmen explains that
crossing the rivers in New Guinea could
be easy, but was often quite difficult.
He describes the river during flood
season as being especially dangerous
because it was easy to lose one’s balance
with a full pack and rifle. Hartmen
also describes the troubles of being
in a watery terrain in regards to their
foxholes. His description is that it would
rain two times a day, and they were
between the mountains and the ocean in
a spot where the land was low and the
jungle was thick. There they would dig

their foxholes when the tide was out,
and when it came back in their holes
would fill up with six to seven inches of
water.19 Homminga also tells about the
trouble the soldiers incurred because of
swampy conditions that they had to deal
with, recalling that they were in swamps
with water up to their knees for three to
four days at a time and that they would
sleep in them, eat in them, and relieve
themselves in them because they had
nowhere else to go. He also explains
how at one point after spending days
going through the swamps he stopped
on dry land, and when he took his
shoes off for the first time after being
soaked through for days on end, his
skin came off with them.20 The oral
histories thus reveal more detailed
information than the written histories
do, going beyond simply stating that the
rivers and swamps caused difficulties to
showing how they did.
The second major discrepancy seen
between the written and oral histories is
an oversimplification on the hardships
and negative effects of the jungle terrain
and the soldiers’ continuing ability
to fight. Written histories typically
oversimplify the problems of hiking
through the terrain. In MacArthur’s
Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea
Campaign Stephen Taaffe states:
New Guinea’s remote and hostile
terrain challenged an American
military establishment that
emphasized firepower, technology,
simplicity, mobility, and material
superiority. In order to win the
campaign, MacArthur had to
overcome not only the Japanese
but also the big island’s horrendous
topography and climate.21

This statement identifies general
problems, but Taaffe does not explain
these problems specifically. The oral
histories again reveal what such
problems meant to the soldiers and how
they affected the course of the campaign.
For example, when dealing with the
issue of mobility, Red Arrow veteran
Homminga explains that the jungle trails
were extremely muddy and went up
and down cliffs that were at seventy-five
degree angles.22 Hartmen also describes
the difficulties of these muddy cliffs.
He states, “It was a nightmare. We
would take three steps forward and we
would slide two steps back.”23 Both
men also describe the difficulties of
sight in a dense jungle. Hartmen says
that the troops could not see twenty to
thirty feet in front of them and that this
caused problems because they never
knew who was shooting at them or
whom they were shooting at. Veteran
Stephen Janicki also goes into detail
about how the lack of visibility because
of the terrain affected their mobility. He
describes the field of vision as being
limited to two feet and that the jungle
was overgrown. He said that the soldiers
never knew which way the bullets were
coming from, and they would holler
out to each other, “It is coming from the
right!” or “It is coming from the left!”24
These oral history accounts provide
richer descriptions of how the terrain
affected the troops while in action. The
written histories state that there were
problems, but they do not explain how
these problems arose, or how the men
coped with them. Through the use of
oral histories the reasoning and evidence
for why the troop’s mobility was
hindered becomes clear.
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Milner, 82.
Hartmen.
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21 Stephen Taaffe, MacArthur’s Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 5.
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23 Hartmen.
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While most written histories do not
utilize oral history accounts, Gailey
does effectively use a total of five oral
histories in MacArthur Strikes Back. In
an interview with First Sergeant Paul
Lutjens describing how the effects of the
terrain impeded the soldiers when they
were hiking to Jaure, a location in New
Guinea, Gailey writes:
It was one green hell to Jaure. We
went up and down continuously;
the company would be stretched
over two to three miles. We’d start
at six every morning by cooking
rice or trying to. Two guys would
work together. If they could start
a fire, which was hard because the
wood was wet even when you cut
deep into the center of the log,
they’d mix a little bully beef into
a canteen cup with rice, to get the
starchy taste out of it. Sometimes
we’d take turns blowing on sparks
trying to start a fire, and keep it up
for two hours without success. I
could hardly describe the country.
It would take five or six hours to
go a mile; edging along cliff walls,
hanging on to vines, up and down,
up and down. The men got weaker;
guys began to lag back….An officer
stayed at the end of the line to keep
driving the stragglers. There wasn’t
any way of evacuating to the rear.
Men with sprained ankles hobbled
along as well as they could, driven
on by fear of being left behind.25
Gailey’s use of this oral history gives
personal details about why the men had
troubles with mobility. It shows how the
watery conditions made it difficult on

the men, not only physically, but with
the tasks of cooking as well. This oral
history gives the necessary narrative
for the reader to understand why the
terrain was difficult for the troops to
maneuver. Gailey’s use of oral histories
and interviews are exceptional, and
they help provide richer context in
regards to how events or obstacles such
as the terrain affected the troops while
in combat. While Gailey does not cite
oral histories often in his account of
the New Guinea Campaign, the small
number of examples he does cite clearly
demonstrate the value of oral histories.
The oral histories offer evidence on why
the terrain caused problems in mobility.
They describe why the obstacles in the
terrain such as steep cliffs, mud, water,
swamps, and overgrown jungle slowed
the men down, which affected their
fighting conditions. The oral history
excerpt that Gailey used provides
evidence that these personal accounts
add new perspectives and insight into
why the terrain affected the troops and
how it affected them.
Through the use of first-hand oral
history accounts a new perspective is
also given in regards to the American and
Australian soldiers’ relationships. The
oral histories of the Red Arrow veterans
provide a more accurate, clearer picture
when examining the complex nature of
the American and Australian soldiers’
interactions. Written histories like Gailey’s
MacArthur Strikes Back tend to focus on
the friction between the Australian and
American soldiers. Gailey writes that
the relation between off-duty American
and Australian servicemen was vexing.26
His book focuses on such incidents as
one which occurred on November 26,

1942 when U.S. Military Police and
Australian soldiers clashed outside of
Brisbane, Australia. The result was that
one Australian solider was killed and
nine were wounded. The following day,
Australian troops randomly attacked
American soldiers, which ended with
twenty-one injured. This written text
emphasizes, “The blending together of
U.S. and Australian systems did not
work well.”27 When Gailey examines the
American and Australian officers’ and
soldiers’ attitudes toward each other, he
uses secondary sources to conclude that
the antipathy felt by individual soldiers
extended to the officers as well.28 In
addition Gailey writes, “Contrary to
the myths that developed in the years
after the war, they [off-duty American
and Australian servicemen] did not
like one another.”29 On the other hand,
oral histories expose a different primary
perspective. They reveal that the
relationships were positive, rather than
the vexing relationships that the written
texts portray.
The Red Arrow veteran’s oral histories
have provided a more accurate, clearer
picture when examining the complex
nature of the American and Australian
soldiers’ relationships. The oral histories
reveal that the common everyday
soldiers did get along well with each
other and were even helpful to one
another. Hartmen’s oral history examines
their interactions, and he concludes
that the Auzzies were good people,
they were terrific fighters, and they got
along well with the soldiers, especially
in New Guinea. He states, “They were
darn good men.”30 He also goes into
depth about how the Australians and
Americans worked well together, unlike
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what the written texts document.
Hartmen tells how the Australians gave
the Americans advice on how to fight.
They told them to keep their heads
down and to follow their common
sense. Red Arrow veteran Erwin
Veneklase also goes into depth on the
Australian soldiers. Veneklase describes
how the Australians gave them helpful
advice. At one point in New Guinea, an
Australian soldier told him, “Don’t shoot
the Japanese, let him go by and then
you hit them in the back of the head
with a gun…take your knife and cut
their throat, that don’t make a sound.”31
This may sound like gruesome advice,
but it was something that could save
the American soldiers’ lives. The oral
histories show that the relation between
the Americans and their Australian
allies was amiable and helpful. Janicki
says, “We went into Brisbane and the
Australian officers came in and told us
how the Japanese operated.”32 Janicki
also explains how the Australian’s advice
helped save their lives. He says that
while they were training in Australia, the
Australians had given them life saving
advice about the necessity of watching
both ahead of them and above them.
After active combat in New Guinea
he recalls, “They realized what the
Australians had told them was true
about the Japanese tying themselves
in the trees.”33 Many of the Red Arrow
veterans respected the Australians
because they recognized the hardships
they were going through without
receiving much repayment. Veneklase
states, “I would say I have the highest
regards for the Australian people. I was
making more in the service than the
guys in Australia were making working
seven days a week.”34 This also shows

that the two systems, as Gailey refers
to them, got along well, were helpful
to one another, respected one another,
and saved each other’s lives by sharing
information. By utilizing oral histories,
new perspectives and new insights
have been added to what the written
texts document. The written texts look
at legitimate points during which the
soldiers may not have gotten along, but
they fail to recognize the whole story.
They do not show that the two groups
did get along the majority of the time.
The oral histories do recognize that
while the Australians and Americans had
reasons not to get along together, they
still did. These first-hand accounts show
that they were friendly and even helpful
to one another, which is something that
the written texts fail to document.
The effects of various tropical diseases
in the New Guinea Campaign are also
characterized more accurately and in
more detail in the oral histories than
in the written histories, which tend
to be vague and inaccurate. These
discrepancies between the written
and oral histories can be seen in the
descriptions of the tropical diseases,
dysentery, the physical effects of malaria,
and in the number of cases of malaria.
The pamphlet New Guinea, issued by
the U.S. Army shortly after the war, is a
prime example of how the written texts
are too vague when describing tropical
diseases in the New Guinea Campaign.
It says:
Disease thrived on New Guinea.
Malaria was the greatest debilitator,
but dengue fever, dysentery, scrub,
typhus, and a host of other tropical
sickness awaited unwary soldiers
in the jungle. Scattered tiny coastal

settlements dotted the flat malarial
north coastline, but inland the lush
tropical jungle swallowed men and
equipment.35
After this statement, which is lacking
in detail, the text goes on to describe
aspects of the terrain. It does not
examine the details of the various
diseases or the effects of the disease on
the soldiers and their abilities to fight
while in combat.
Dysentery is also vaguely addressed
in MacArthur Strikes Back. Gailey
inadequately addresses the issue of
the many tropical diseases. He writes,
“Intestinal disorders and skin diseases
were epidemic. Severe diarrheas
and dysentery could not be treated
adequately given the conditions along
the trail…”36 Milner also explains the
problem of dysentery with insufficient
detail. Milner writes, “Dysentery was
the most widespread affliction.”37 Gailey
and Milner refer to the vastness of
the various diseases, but neither one
examines indepth the effects that these
tropical diseases had on the men.
The Red Arrow veterans’ oral histories
provide the dramatic descriptions and
necessary information on the effects
of the various diseases on the soldiers’
ability to fight, and they provide the
necessary context to understanding
the written records. In Hartmen’s oral
history, he says that there were flies all
over the food, and the men were getting
dysentery because of it. He explains that
they were all passing blood, and the
medics did not know what to do about
it because it was not a couple of men,
but the whole regiment of two to three
thousand men.38 Janicki also describes
the effects of dysentery on him. He says
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that he entered the war weighing one
hundred and eighty pounds and he left
the hospital weighing one hundred and
twenty pounds because of dysentery.39
Descriptive details such as these add
new insight into what the effects of
dysentery were on the men. Rather
than plainly stating that it was a large
problem, these oral histories show that
the men who were suffering from these
tropical diseases, especially dysentery,
were impeded by the effects while
fighting a war. They were physically
exhausted, they were passing blood,
and they were losing an extensive
amount of weight, which crippled them
while trying to march through a dense,
mountainous jungle, fighting a war.
Malaria is another example of a
tropical disease that is not adequately
described by the written histories in
terms of its physical effects. Malaria is
generally addressed, but not with the
sufficient details of what it is, or how it
affected the troops. On the other hand,
the Red Arrow veterans’ oral histories
provide these necessary details, which
the written histories tend to gloss
over. In MacArthur Strikes Back, Gailey
states, “Malaria was a scourge, and the
hard pressed officers, faced with an
increasing number of battle casualties,
could do little to aid those who had the
debilitating disease.”40 This statement
raises the questions: what are the
symptoms of malaria and how did they
affect the men? Author Samuel Milner
also uses vague descriptions when
describing malaria. He writes, “Some
of the men picked up malaria in the
mosquito-infested swamps along the
Musa, and the weakening effects of the
march were apparent in the subsequent
operations of the battalion.”41 This

written statement does not describe
what the weakening effects were or what
malaria did to the men who were trying
to fight a war in the dense New Guinea
jungle while being infected with this
horrific tropical disease.
The Red Arrow personal narratives
thoroughly examine the physical effects
of malaria, giving a different perspective
on the “debilitating disease” and its
“weakening effects.”
Red Arrow veteran Robert Hartmen
goes into more detail about how malaria
physically affected him while fighting in
New Guinea. In his oral history he states:
[I] had a 103-degree/104 degree
fever, and I went to the medics.
There they gave me twenty-five
grams of quinine, and they lay me
down on the ground. They put a
cover over me and twenty-four hours
later my fever broke, and they sent
me back to the front lines.42
This description gives a different
perspective on how it directly affected
the common soldier. It shows how
severe their fevers were and what little
medical help was available to aid them.
Red Arrow veteran Homminga also
describes malaria in a more detailed
way that gives a new perspective on the
disease. He states,
Malaria is a disease that is
transmitted by the mosquito and
it enters your system in your liver
and kidneys. You get an extremely
high fever and you get the chills.
You could shake a bed across the
floor….It takes days to get over an
episode, but you always have the
bug in your system.43

Veteran Stephen Janicki also explains
the symptoms of malaria. In his oral
history he says, “you got a high fever,
and you became soaking wet with
sweat, and then you would suddenly be
absolutely freezing.”44 He explains that
you would go from hot to cold, and that
you became delirious and eventually
passed out.45 These descriptions also
give a different look into the disease
malaria than the written histories do.
They describe how malaria infected the
men, and they explain the symptoms of
the disease. By utilizing oral histories,
a detailed description of the disease
is given rather than the simple vague
statements in the written histories such
as, “Malaria and exhaustion were taking
a toll on the men inside and outside the
block.”46 Oral histories give a more vivid
description and definition of malaria
than the written texts. By utilizing these
oral histories, malaria can be understood
in a more detailed manner, and through
the use of oral histories, many aspects of
malaria that are in the written histories
and are wrong can be corrected.
The written histories also give
inaccurate information in terms of the
number of cases of malaria in the New
Guinea Campaign. Had the authors
utilized oral histories, these false
descriptions would not have occurred.
Stephen Taaffe writes in MacArthur’s
Jungle War,
Malaria initially caused SWPA
[South Pacific Area] problems. In
February 1943, for example, 23
out of every 1000 SWPA personnel
were in hospital with malaria at any
given time, and the average stay the
following month was twenty-eight
days per afflicted patient.”47
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He then adds:
MacArthur appointed Colonel
Howard Smith, a former public
health officer who had been the
Philippines’ chief of quarantine
service, to bring malaria under
control. Smith and other SWPA
health officers introduced DDT,
repellent cream, atabrine (a
synthetic quinine), mosquito
netting, and other suppressant
and prevention measures to the
theatre….Such stringent measures
worked. In March 1944, only 2 per
1000 SWPA personnel were in the
hospital for malaria at any given
time, and the average stay was nine
days. In fact, as of 1 April 1944,
there were only 751 malaria cases
throughout the entire theatre.48
Taaffe researches the malaria problem by
utilizing medical records from the U.S.
Army forces in the Southwest Pacific
Area. He does not utilize oral histories
or examine first-person accounts. This
leads to problems because the common
soldiers, those who were infected with
malaria, are not being consulted. Only
second-hand written medical reports
are used, and, in this case, they tend
to be inaccurate, portraying malaria as
an improving problem with fewer men
contracting malaria after 1944 because
of new medical improvements and
preventions. By utilizing the soldiers’
oral histories, a different story is told.
The oral histories from Red Arrow
veterans like Janicki, Homminga, and
Hartmen demonstrate that malaria was
a much larger problem than Taaffe’s
sources indicated. Homminga explains,

“It was a one hundred percent killer,
everyone had malaria.”49 He also goes on
to describe the severity of the problem,
which also explains how inaccurate
the numbers in written texts were.
Homminga describes the conditions in
regards to malaria:
After being in combat for a little bit
they had too many people getting
malaria so they wouldn’t let you go
to the medics, hospital, whatever
unless you had a one hundred and
five degree fever or passed out….
They were pretty picky about
whether you had a one hundred
and five degree fever or not.50
This evidence, revealed through an oral
history, contradicts the written texts. By
utilizing oral histories, the inaccuracies
in the written texts can be corrected.
While improvements may have been
made by 1944, the problem was not
solved. Many men had previously
contracted malaria, and once it entered
their systems, they always had it. Also,
despite medical improvements, Taaffe
fails to recognize the severe conditions
the men had to be in, before they could
leave the front lines to see a medic,
which explains why the U.S. medical
records showed such a small number of
cases, which in turn made the malaria
problem look like it had undergone vast
improvements between 1943 and 1944.
Had the medical records recognized that
men on the front lines were suffering
from malaria, or had Taaffe utilized oral
histories, his analysis would not have
been so far off.

By only utilizing the medical records,
Taaffe is not only getting inaccurate
numbers, he is failing to get the full
picture on why the men had to have
one hundred and five degree fevers
in order to be sent to the hospital.
Oral histories reveal this perspective.
Sergeant Hartmen explains, “We were
getting to the point where we couldn’t
afford to lose another man to malaria.
We were outfitted by the Japanese as it
was.”51 Red Arrow veteran Janicki also
offers further insight into the number
of malaria-infected soldiers. In his oral
history, he explains that there were
nearly fifty to one hundred men on
the front lines at any given time, all of
whom were suffering from malaria, yet
they were still forced to fight unless their
fevers reached one hundred and five
degrees or they fainted.52 Through these
oral histories a new perspective on the
high number of soldiers infected with
malaria is seen. The Red Arrow veterans’
oral histories divulge the truth about the
campaign. They correct the written text,
revealing that the number of infected
men was not down, rather the troop’s
fevers had to reach one hundred and
five degrees or they had to faint in order
to be sent to a medical facility. This
is one aspect of the problem that the
written texts have failed to recognize
making those texts inaccurate. By only
researching malaria through the medical
records, Taaffe is failing to understand
the full problem that the Red Arrow
veterans’ oral histories divulge.
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In conclusion, personal narratives
clearly play an important part in
understanding the history of the New
Guinea Campaign. Oral histories
provide personal accounts from the
viewpoints of both the officers and
common soldiers. This adds a new
perspective to what the written histories
have documented in terms of training,
terrain, allies’ relationships, and tropical
diseases. They question the accuracy
of some written texts, and they clarify
other areas of the campaigns that
the written texts have only vaguely
examined. By utilizing oral histories,
the story of the everyday individual
soldier is told, which gives a different
perspective and new insights into the
New Guinea Campaign that cannot be
seen in the written records. They collect
and preserve the recorded memories of
our veterans, which is a valuable and
irreplaceable resource.
In the words of one soldier,
Wellington Francis Homminga, “The
entire story comes together when oral
histories are a part of it.”53 He also offers
valuable insight into the positive effects
of using oral histories. He remarks,
“When we are gone history is gone with
us, unless it is recorded, so I am glad
you did this.”54 The Red Arrow veterans’
oral histories are a valuable resource that
offers a different view than the written
texts. They preserve our past, and
in doing so, they clarify, correct, and
increase the necessary descriptions in
the New Guinea Campaign.

53
54

Homminga.
Homminga.

GVSU McNair Scholars Journal VOLUME 9, 2005

33

Bibliography
Blakeley, Major General H.W. The 32nd Infantry Division In World War II. Nashville: The Battery Press, 1957.
Gailey, Harry A. MacArthur’s Victory: The War in New Guinea 1942-1943. New York: Presidio Press, 2004.
Gailey, Harry A. MacArthur’s Victory: The War in New Guinea 1943-1944. New York: Presidio Press, 2004.
Hartmen Robert. oral history, Michigan Military History Institute.
Homminga, Wellington Francis. oral history, Michigan Military History Institute.
Janicki, Stephen. oral history, Michigan Military History Institute.
Milner, Samuel. Victory in Papua: The War in the Pacific. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1957.
“New Guinea.” U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II, (unknown date).
“The Red Arrow in World War II,” http://www.32nd-division.org/history/ww2/32ww2.html.
Taaffe, Stephen R. MacArthur’s Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998.
Veneklase, Erwin. oral history, Michigan Military History Institute.
Public Relations Office, 32nd Infantry Division. “13,000 Hours, Combat History of the 32nd Infantry Division - World War II, The Philippine Islands.” 1944.

34

The New Guinea Campaign: A New Perspective Through the Use of Oral Histories

